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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Obama administration has undertaken a rebalancing of US 
attention, efforts, and assets both to the Asia-Pacific region and within 
that region. Yet congressional dysfunction and inattention have 
repeatedly undermined the Obama administration’s ability to execute its 
rebalance strategy. 
While partisan gridlock in Congress has hindered the execution of US 
foreign policy overall, it has disproportionately affected US policy 
towards the Asia-Pacific because the region has had few champions in 
either house in recent years. And where key members have sought to 
protect US engagement in the Middle East and Eastern Europe from the 
worst effects of congressional dysfunction, there have been far fewer 
efforts with regard to US engagement in the Asia Pacific. To the extent 
individual members have claimed to focus on the region, it has often 
been in pursuit of narrow objectives focused on a single country or issue 
area.  
This Analysis provides some suggestions for greater engagement 
between US and regional policymakers and Congress. Though there are 
signs of increased interest in the current Congress, the nature of that 
interest and whether it can be sustained will depend on efforts by 
individual members, administration officials, and US allies and partners 
in the years to come.  
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When President Barack Obama announced a renewed US focus on the 
Asia-Pacific region in a landmark address to the Australian Parliament in 
November 2011, it heralded a gradual but unmistakable rebalancing of 
US attention, efforts, and assets both to the region and within the 
region.1 Yet, while Obama’s speech at Parliament House in Canberra 
was well received, most of Capitol Hill has never come around to his 
rebalance strategy.2 In fact, in several important respects, the US 
Congress has thwarted its implementation. The gap between the Obama 
administration and the US Congress on Asia-Pacific policy is a product 
of both the general decline of Congress as an institution and the specific 
decline of Asia expertise among its members. 
Congress has become increasingly dysfunctional as a result of political 
polarisation in both houses, a consequence in part of ideologically 
cohesive districts and increasing political polarisation in the broader 
population. That dysfunction has disproportionately affected those issues 
without powerful champions, such as engagement with the Asia-Pacific 
region. While key members of Congress have sought to shield US 
engagement in the Middle East or Eastern Europe from the worst effects 
of congressional gridlock, engagement with the Asia Pacific has lacked 
such protection. When members have turned their attention to Asia-
Pacific issues, it has often been in pursuit of narrow objectives focused 
on a single country or issue, without reference to a broader regional 
strategy. Indeed, one risk is that Congress may well replace a lack of 
interest in Asian affairs with an unhealthy preoccupation with China. 
This Analysis first sketches the Obama administration’s policy towards 
the Asia-Pacific region from 2011 to 2015. Next, it explores the sources 
of congressional interest in foreign policy and the region, including 
constituent groups and personal interests. These sources lead most 
members to focus on other areas of foreign policy rather than the Asia 
Pacific, or on narrow sets of issues in the Asia Pacific rather than the 
region as a strategic system where US national interests are at stake. 
The Analysis then identifies specific episodes of partisan gridlock that 
have hindered the achievement of foreign policy objectives that 
otherwise enjoy broad support. Finally, it offers some recommendations 
for deepening Congress’ engagement with Asia-Pacific issues. 
THE MUCH MISUNDERSTOOD REBALANCE 
The rebalance has often been misportrayed as an effort to contain 
China. When the press and members of Congress have made reference 
to the rebalance, they have frequently argued that the administration’s 
strategy has failed because it has not been hard enough on Beijing. But 
that debate misrepresents the goals and strategy behind the rebalance, 
which is primarily about supporting the norms and institutions that 
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undergird the liberal order in the Asia-Pacific region, and was never 
intended to be (all) about China.  
THREE ASSUMPTIONS 
Within the Obama administration, three assumptions shaped the 
decision to rebalance to the Asia Pacific.3 First, it was apparent that the 
greatest share of the world’s economic dynamism would shift to the 
emerging economies of East, South, and Southeast Asia over the 
coming century. Economic engagement with the region was therefore 
critical to US prosperity. The ability to invest in the development of these 
economies, and to sell goods and services to their growing middle 
classes, would power US growth for decades to come. To take 
advantage of this dynamic, in 2010 the United States joined negotiations 
to further liberalise regional trade in goods and services, and expand the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) into a large, high-standard trade pact.4 
Second, as Asia’s economic transition continued, Asian countries would 
improve the capacity of their armed forces. For many in the Obama 
administration, this need not be a cause for concern unless that hard 
power were to be used to bend the norms and institutions of the 
international system to the whims of rising illiberal powers.5 To help 
shape the future of the regional order, the Obama administration 
resolved to ensure it was at the table and in a position to shape 
important norms and institutions when they were discussed and tested, 
both diplomatically and militarily. The United States joined the East Asia 
Summit and its associated organs in 2010,6 and the Pentagon 
announced that it would deploy 60 per cent of its overseas naval and air 
assets to the Pacific region by 2020.7 
Neither of these first two assumptions was particularly different from 
those of the Obama foreign policy team’s predecessors in the Bush 
administration. Following Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s 
announcement at the 2009 ASEAN Regional Forum that the United 
States was “back in Asia,” former Bush officials protested, not 
unreasonably, that they had never left Asia.8 But the Obama 
administration’s commitment to end two wars in the Middle East offered 
an opportunity to increase US engagement in a way that the Bush 
administration, distracted by Iraq and Afghanistan, was unable to do. 
The attention, energy, and resources that have been thrown into TPP 
negotiations, regional diplomacy, and military engagement represent a 
significant increase in tempo from the Bush administration. 
But the rebalance was not just about tempo. A third assumption 
distinguished the Obama administration’s approach from its 
predecessors. The Bush administration, like most of its predecessors 
since the Vietnam War, was primarily focused on Northeast Asia. There 
were several disadvantages to this approach: much of the economic 
growth in the region was now occurring in Southeast Asia; the 
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concentration of US forces in Northeast Asia made them more 
vulnerable to attack, and less agile in contingencies elsewhere in the 
region; and the lion’s share of regional diplomacy was organised and led 
by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 
From this last assumption was born the “rebalance within the rebalance,” 
through which the United States increased diplomatic, military, and 
economic engagement with Southeast Asia relative to Northeast Asia.9 
While the shift that followed has been perhaps the least appreciated 
aspect of US policy in the region, it has been among the most important. 
The United States improved its attendance record at key Southeast 
Asian diplomatic conferences and joined several new ones, giving US 
officials a voice in debates over the future of the regional order.10 The 
United States also shifted its military presence south, by deploying  
2500 Marines to Australia, sending four Littoral Combat Ships to 
Singapore, penning a comprehensive partnership with Vietnam, and 
signing an agreement with Manila that allows US forces to rotate through 
the Philippines and use the Philippines’ facilities. 
This increase in diplomatic engagement with Southeast Asia gave the 
United States a voice in the most important discussions of regional 
norms over the ensuing years. But just as importantly, by empowering 
Southeast Asian nations to take the lead in regional diplomacy and then 
pledging to back up their autonomy with an increased military presence, 
the United States indicated that it seeks to create space for the countries 
of the region to chart their own strategic futures, rather than dictate those 
futures to them, either alone or in cooperation with Beijing or any other 
power. That autonomy is a fundamental element of the liberal system the 
United States seeks to defend. 
CHALLENGES IN THE EXECUTION OF THE REBALANCE 
Though the fundamentals of the rebalance strategy are sound, the 
communication of the strategy has been problematic. In particular, the 
rebalance has failed to deliver the high-level attention from some 
administration principals that the early stages of the strategy led the 
region to expect. While former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton 
dedicated significant time and attention to Asia, her successor, John 
Kerry, has focused on diplomacy in the Middle East and Europe.11 
Where former National Security Adviser Tom Donilon spent a significant 
period of time on bilateral diplomacy with China, his successor, Susan 
Rice, has focused greater attention on crises involving Ukraine, the 
Islamic State, and Ebola. 
Greater attention from principals would have been helpful in more 
effectively communicating the priority the administration places on the 
Asia-Pacific region, and may have prevented messaging mistakes such 
as the administration’s initial opposition to the China-led Asia 
Infrastructure Investment Bank. But the institutionalisation of the 
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rebalance strategy started in Obama’s first term. By designating larger 
budgets for the region and establishing a more frequent pattern of 
diplomatic and military interaction in the region, as well as ongoing 
negotiations towards the TPP, the administration committed the United 
States to steadily increasing the time, energy, and money its officials 
spend on the region, whether its principals’ hearts are in the strategy or 
not. That increase has not waned. 
However, the administration also failed to convince sceptics that the 
rebalance was not an attempt to contain China. In this, the 
administration shares some blame. The Pentagon under the Obama 
administration has occasionally described the rebalance and its 
increased military engagement with security partners in the region — 
partnerships that are intended to achieve a broad range of security goals 
— in terms that suggest it is merely an effort to counter China, rather 
than a more sophisticated effort to build partnerships and patterns of 
interaction with the militaries of the region.  
As a result, the rebalance has often been judged by members of the 
press and members of Congress by how tough administration officials 
have been on Beijing.12 But the rebalance was never intended to be all 
about China. Rather, the rebalance was designed to uphold the liberal 
order in the region, principally through engagement with the entire 
region, including China.13 Moreover, US officials have been careful not to 
take any actions that would present countries of the region a stark 
choice between Washington and Beijing, a choice Southeast Asian 
leaders have repeatedly said they do not want to be asked to make.14 
There has also been a recognition that Chinese actions that disregard 
international norms and laws are serious challenges to the regional 
order, and that the United States must seek to deter those actions. But 
the United States has not attempted to prevent China’s rise, merely 
those Chinese actions that are inconsistent with international norms and 
laws. 
Despite missteps in communicating the rebalance, it still represents a 
substantial increase in engagement with the region which understands 
the importance of third country sensitivities in US–China competition. 
The United States has been held back, not so much by the Obama 
administration’s inattention or an unwillingness to be tough on China, but 
by a Congress so paralysed by partisanship that it can no longer carry 
out some of its most basic functions.  
CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY 
The US Constitution distinguishes the American system from the 
parliamentary system common to many of its allies including Australia, 
by reserving specific foreign policy powers for Congress. These include 
the power to declare war, raise an army, maintain a navy, and regulate 
foreign commerce. Most scholars have argued that in the field of foreign 
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policy, the Constitution does not so much decree a separation of powers, 
as popularly thought, but rather a sharing of powers.15 
Through its broader power to authorise and appropriate funds and to 
conduct oversight, Congress has a significant ability to influence foreign 
policy. In the best circumstances, this can lead to what the former 
chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Lee Hamilton, called 
a “creative tension” between the executive and legislative branches.16 
These tensions between Congress and the administration have grown 
since the Vietnam War, when scholars generally agree Congress 
became more actively interventionist in foreign policy.17  
In recent years, however, “creative tension” has descended into gridlock, 
with great consequences for Asia-Pacific policy. The polarisation of the 
US public, and the rise of more ideologically cohesive districts, have led 
to increasing polarisation in both houses of Congress. The growing 
ideological chasm between Democrats and Republicans on Capitol Hill 
has made even the most basic functions of Congress difficult to achieve. 
On foreign policy, and particularly on Asia-Pacific policy, the loss in 
recent electoral cycles of senior leaders who might have once delivered 
bipartisan protection of important priorities has exacerbated the 
consequences of this decline, with serious ramifications for US 
leadership in the world and in the Asia-Pacific region in particular. 
PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES 
Over the past two decades, Democrats and Republicans have become 
increasingly ideologically orthodox.18 In 1992, according to Pew 
Research Center survey data, the median Democrat was to the left of  
64 per cent of Republicans. Now the median Democrat is to the left of  
92 per cent of Republicans. The median Republican has gone from a 
position to the right of 70 per cent of Democrats to a position to the right 
of 94 per cent of Democrats.19  
Moreover, congressional districts have become increasingly ideologically 
cohesive, either because many are drawn that way by state legislators 
— a practice sometimes known as gerrymandering — or because 
Americans have ‘sorted’ themselves into like-minded communities and 
districts over the last two decades.20 Most seats in the House, therefore, 
are ‘safe seats’, in the sense that they are unlikely to flip from one party 
to the other. In the 2014 general election, the average margin of victory 
in the House was more than 35 percentage points. Of 435 seats, only 26 
(6 per cent) were decided by a margin of 5 percentage points or less.21 
But these seats are not necessarily ‘safe’ for the members who hold 
them. Senators and representatives must worry about a challenge not 
from the other party, but from within their own party. While primary 
challenges have always been a feature of the US electoral system, the 
increase in ideological cohesion has increased the perceived likelihood 
of success for challengers attacking from the flanks. These challenges 
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produce more hard-line members of Congress, and fear of such a 
challenge drives many members to adopt more extreme positions once 
in office.22 
Even senators — who are elected from states with permanent 
boundaries and are therefore immune to the effects of gerrymandering 
— are increasingly vulnerable to primary challenges from constituents 
who expect their representatives to hew to an ideological orthodoxy. The 
long-serving chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Senator Richard Lugar, was defeated by just such a challenge in 2012. 
These extreme positions are reflected in measurements of partisan unity 
within Congress. Since the 1970s, the Republican and Democrat 
caucuses have become increasingly cohesive, and further and further 
apart when their votes are scored along an ideological spectrum.23 As 
Thomas Mann and Norm Ornstein have noted, the parties now 
demonstrate a level of discipline resembling a parliamentary system.24 
Yet unlike a parliamentary system, the US system of separation of 
powers requires compromise if anything is to be accomplished. This is 
particularly true in the Senate, where a supermajority of 60 per cent of 
votes can be required to pass legislation. 
THE LOSS OF SENIOR LEADERS 
Since the 1970s, Congress has also undergone an institutional 
decentralisation that has diminished the influence of senior members. 
This shift has been exacerbated by the departure of several former 
opinion leaders in foreign affairs in both houses since 2010. Junior 
members are now far less likely to find senior members with foreign 
affairs leadership experience whom they can rely on for guidance.  
The loss is most pronounced in the Senate. Three former chairmen of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee — Richard Lugar, Joe Biden, 
and John Kerry — all departed between 2008 and 2012. As a result, the 
most senior members on foreign policy in the current Congress are not 
very senior at all. Kerry waited 24 years after his election to the Senate 
in 1984 to become chairman of the committee. By contrast, his 
successor, Senator Robert Menendez, waited just six years.  
As one senior official in the Clinton administration explained, in the 1990s 
it was possible to call three senior members of the House Democratic 
caucus on a foreign policy issue, and each would carry with him 50 
votes.25 As White House defeats in the House on Syria and trade have 
shown, that is no longer the case. Now, the administration must work 
much harder to convince many more members to vote with it on foreign 
policy issues. On the recent vote on the Obama administration’s Iran 
deal, only a campaign-style effort, costing millions of dollars, was able to 
win over enough members to prevent Congress from scuttling the deal.26 
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FOREIGN POLICY CONSEQUENCES 
As the parties’ positions have drifted further apart, it has become 
increasingly difficult for the members of the two parties to find a zone of 
compromise.27 This difficulty afflicts not just grand bargains or the most 
controversial issues, but the basic functions of Congress: authorising 
and appropriating funds. 
The first indication of the new era of congressional dysfunction came 
seven months after the 112th Congress was sworn in. In August 2011, 
the Republican leadership of the House of Representatives refused to 
pass legislation raising the ceiling on the amount of debt that can be 
issued by the Treasury without major budget cuts in return. The debt 
ceiling is normally raised by Congress without significant controversy, 
because Congress has already authorised and appropriated the funds, 
and because a failure to do so would likely result in a sovereign default. 
But the increasingly conservative Republican caucus in the House 
sought the opportunity to achieve greater spending cuts by holding 
hostage the full faith and credit of the federal government. 
Despite intense negotiations between President Obama and Speaker of 
the House John Boehner, no grand bargain on spending cuts could be 
reached. In order to raise the debt ceiling and avert sovereign default, 
Obama and Boehner agreed to throw further deliberations to an 
extraordinary ‘supercommittee’ of both houses to hash out a 
compromise. The supercommittee’s plan would have then gone to the 
floor of both houses for an up-or-down vote. If the supercommittee did 
not deliver a plan, the cuts would be carried out indiscriminately, across 
the board, by ‘sequestering’ appropriations. The prospect of 
indiscriminate cuts was meant to be so unthinkable that the committee 
would be forced to return a plan. 
Yet the supercommittee still could not compromise. The indiscriminate 
cuts, which are split evenly between defence and non-defence spending, 
began to take effect in 2013. Despite efforts to lift sequestration, it 
remains in place.28 This presents a serious challenge to the United 
States’ ability to maintain a high level of diplomatic and military 
engagement overseas. In particular, it has thrown into doubt whether the 
Pentagon will be able to continue to increase the number of ships and 
aircraft deployed to East Asia as part of the rebalance.29  
GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWN 
A further example of congressional dysfunction was the shutdown of the 
federal government in October 2013, when a faction of the Republican 
caucus in the House refused to approve a continuing resolution that 
would have funded government operations. They objected to provisions 
funding parts of the Obama administration’s universal healthcare plan. 
The plan, known as ‘Obamacare’, had already been approved three 
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years earlier but requires Congress to approve further funding annually if 
it is to run effectively.  
Though many (if not a majority) of Republican members did not favour a 
shutdown, fearing that Americans would blame them for the dysfunction, 
the shutdown campaign by right-wing members of their caucus put them 
in a difficult position: vote to fund the government, and risk a primary 
challenge from a more conservative candidate the following year; vote 
not to fund the government, and most Americans would view 
Republicans as responsible for the gridlock on the Hill. 
For the Republican leadership, the question was even more acute, with 
House Speaker John Boehner concerned about a coup by more 
conservative members of his own caucus if he allowed the funding to 
pass with mostly Democrat votes. For 16 days, the federal government 
partially shut down, suspending non-essential functions, before Boehner 
allowed a vote to fund the government. 
The shutdown had foreign policy consequences. The failure revealed the 
sclerosis of the US political system at a time when many elites worldwide 
were wondering whether democratic systems could meet the challenges 
of the 21st century.30 At a more immediate level, it forced President 
Obama to stay at home to work on the crisis, rather than travelling during 
the first week of the shutdown to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) summit in Indonesia, where he was to push US trade and 
economic objectives, and most critically to the East Asia Summit in the 
Philippines, where he was to address Chinese assertiveness in the 
South China Sea. Southeast Asian leaders, looking for a signal of US 
commitment to the region, were left wondering whether the United 
States’ political system would permit it to continue to support the regional 
order.31 
THE FAILURE OF THE AUTHORISATION PROCESS 
The government shutdown was only the most extreme example of 
partisanship preventing Congress from addressing its regular order of 
business. For the last half century, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (SFRC) and House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) have 
held the responsibility of writing and passing a law authorising spending 
by the State Department. These authorisations are then funded by an 
appropriations bill, which is written and passed by the Foreign 
Operations Subcommittee of the Senate and House appropriations 
committees. 
Yet disagreements over social policy overseas, particularly whether to 
fund family planning organisations that discuss abortion with their clients, 
has meant that Congress has not passed an authorisation bill for the 
State Department since 2002. In this way, the SFRC and HFAC have 
lost their most important tool for influencing foreign policy. The 
appropriations committees, through the foreign operations 
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subcommittees, now arguably have more influence over foreign policy 
than the foreign affairs committees, where the greater subject matter 
expertise lies.32  
SFRC and HFAC still hold oversight hearings, and occasionally withhold 
authorisation for executive departments to spend money on line items 
through a back-end process of what are known as ‘congressional 
notifications’. In the Senate, the SFRC also considers ambassadorial 
nominees and other foreign affairs nominees. These hearings and 
processes, however, focus the mind of the committee on a single issue 
or country in isolation, rather than the broader strategy for a region or 
issue area. That narrow focus often discourages a more strategic 
approach to regional foreign policy. 
IMPACT ON ASIA-PACIFIC POLICY  
Congressional dysfunction has made US policy in a wide range of areas 
less discerning and less strategic, but its effects have been particularly 
acute in policy towards the Asia Pacific. While Congress has shielded 
US engagement in the Middle East or Eastern Europe from the worst 
effects of congressional dysfunction, members have not made the same 
effort on East Asia. This neglect has expanded the scope for individual 
members to push specific concerns with respect to a single country or 
issue, without regard to how it fits into a broader regional strategy. 
The fallout from a particular episode of congressional gridlock is 
instructive in this regard. In late 2013, Republicans were using the 
chamber’s requirement for a 60 per cent supermajority to block an 
unprecedented number of judicial appointees.33 In response, Senate 
Majority Leader Harry Reid decided to take what had become known in 
Washington as the “nuclear option,” eliminating four decades of 
precedent by changing the rules to require only a simple majority to 
move to a vote on most nominations.34 
Republicans saw this as an extraordinary violation of the rights of the 
minority party, and in retaliation availed themselves of other 
obstructionist tactics unique to the US Senate, including forcing the 
chamber to take days to approve any administration nominee. Among 
these nominees were dozens of individuals recently nominated for 
ambassadorial positions by the Obama administration. The dispute 
continued for around ten months, at one point leaving vacant nearly a 
quarter of all ambassadorial posts overseas.35 
The dispute did not affect all regions equally, however. When Russian 
forces annexed Crimea, Republicans in the Senate relented and allowed 
the new ambassador to Russia to be confirmed. In the Middle East, the 
Senate quickly allowed ambassadors to Iraq, Egypt, and Kuwait to be 
confirmed. But nominees for Asia Pacific did not receive special 
dispensation until the Republicans relented en masse. The nominee for 
While Congress has 
shielded US engagement 
in the Middle East or 
Eastern Europe from the 
worst effects of 
congressional 
dysfunction, members 
have not made the same 
effort on East Asia. 
 CONGRESS AND ASIA-PACIFIC POLICY: DYSFUNCTION AND NEGLECT 
 
11
 
ambassador to Vietnam, a country eagerly seeking reassurance from 
the United States due to tensions in the South China Sea, waited five 
months. The US Permanent Representative to ASEAN waited nine 
months, thus missing several important meetings on the tensions in the 
South China Sea. 
LACK OF LEADERSHIP ON THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 
Few members in recent Congresses are focused on Asia-Pacific 
policy.36 The region has still not captured the attention of the American 
public or the media, as there are few votes and few appearances on 
Meet the Press to be won through work on the region. The press still 
focuses disproportionately on Europe and the Middle East. When 
President Obama travelled to China, Myanmar, and Australia for a series 
of summits in November 2014, the press plane chartered for the trip was 
half full.37 As one staffer on the Hill explained: 
“You need a position on the Middle East peace process to run 
for office in this country. You don’t need one on the South China 
Sea.”38 
It is not surprising, then, that interest in the region has waned. With 
Senators Bond and Webb departing at the end of 2010 and 2012, 
respectively, there are few senators with an interest in or experience with 
Southeast Asia issues in particular. The Asia-Pacific Subcommittee of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is among the least coveted 
committee assignments. In 2015, after presidential contender Senator 
Marco Rubio turned down the chairmanship of the subcommittee, it went 
to a freshman, Colorado Senator Cory Gardner.39 
SINKING THE LAW OF THE SEA 
Hyperpartisanship, the loss of leadership and the lack of congressional 
interest in Asia have all contributed to one of the more damaging 
decisions taken by Congress in the last few years in terms of US 
interests in the Asia Pacific: the refusal to consent to the ratification of 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Though the failure 
to ratify the convention diminishes US leadership in the world more 
broadly, because the debate over rules and norms is strongly contested 
between the United States and China, it had particularly grave 
consequences for US leadership in the Asia Pacific. 
The United States, concerned about Chinese flouting of international 
norms in the Asia-Pacific region, has argued that all countries in the 
region should embrace UNCLOS, which affirms freedom of navigation 
and lays out mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of maritime 
disputes. Yet this advocacy has been made somewhat self-consciously, 
because the United States itself has never ratified the convention. In the 
1980s, President Ronald Reagan refused to sign UNCLOS because he 
took issue with the way it divided and taxed seabed resources. These 
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concerns were resolved through a 1994 renegotiation of the convention, 
allowing President Bill Clinton to sign the treaty. But opposition remains 
on the conservative wing of the Republican Party, where extreme 
scepticism towards any international organisation seems to animate 
suspicions that the treaty will encroach to an unacceptable degree on 
US sovereignty.40 
In 2012, with tensions rising over Chinese assertiveness in the South 
China Sea, a bipartisan push was made by Senators Kerry and McCain 
to persuade their colleagues to consent to the ratification of UNCLOS. 
Yet, as the end of the session approached, a right wing political action 
committee began pressuring moderate Republican senators who had 
not yet declared their opposition. Under pressure, Senators Rob 
Portman and Kelly Ayotte, both known to be champions of international 
engagement, became the 33rd and 34th senators to declare their 
opposition. Because the 100-member US Senate requires a two-thirds 
majority to ratify any treaty, Portman and Ayotte’s decision sunk the 
effort to ratify the treaty.41 
In a less partisan atmosphere, moderate Republicans would have been 
free to vote for the treaty. Moreover, if more leaders in the Senate had 
experience with Asia-Pacific issues, McCain would have likely been 
joined by other senior members of his party in seeking to convince fellow 
members of his caucus to join him in supporting UNCLOS. It is difficult 
for the United States to advocate for the liberal international order, and to 
pressure rising powers like China to accept and obey international law, 
when the US Senate rejects the concept outright. 
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
One potential response to the argument that congressional dysfunction 
has become an obstacle to deeper US engagement in the Asia Pacific 
was the recent passage of the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), which 
gives the president the right to submit a trade agreement like the TPP for 
an up-or-down vote. But, in fact, the very tight vote in favour of TPA 
underlined many of the problems referred to above.  
Among policymakers in the Obama administration and in the foreign 
policy community of both parties in Washington, the TPP is seen as the 
linchpin of the rebalance strategy. On the Hill, however, it is seen very 
differently. When Obama delivered his State of the Union Address to 
Congress in January 2015, he seemed to recognise this in putting a 
harder, even mercantilist, edge on the administration’s talking points 
about economic engagement when he exclaimed: 
“China wants to write the rules for the world’s fastest-growing 
region. That would put our workers and our businesses at a 
disadvantage. Why would we let that happen? We should write 
those rules. We should level the playing field.”42 
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Though the president’s remarks referred to a debate over rules, as the 
rest of his rebalance strategy does, the context and underlying tone 
suggested this was primarily about seeking to divert the benefits of trade 
to the United States. 
The leadership of both the Senate and House trade committees pushed 
for passage of the measure, and the measure eventually passed with 
support from Republicans and moderate Democrats. But the debate in 
Congress focused on issues such as tariffs, labour protections, and the 
perception that the TPP would be a handout to big business. 
Sophisticated arguments about TPP’s importance to the US position in 
Asia played little role in swaying the 28 Democrats in the House and  
13 Democrats in the Senate who voted for the bill.43 
In an earlier era, members who otherwise nursed lingering concerns 
about the specific costs of free trade could be convinced by colleagues 
concerned about geopolitical issues in East Asia to support agreements 
that were in the broader national interest.44 As that era has ended, 
members of Congress have increasingly prevailed upon trade 
negotiators to commit to the defence of narrow interests in order to 
receive authorisation to make a deal, tying negotiators’ hands and 
making trade agreements like the TPP much more difficult to conclude.45 
THE LACK OF A STRATEGIC APPROACH 
While few members of Congress are interested in Asia-Pacific policy, 
there are a number of members, particularly in the House, who are 
interested in specific countries or issues in the Asia Pacific. Their interest 
is often driven by a large immigrant or ethnic population in their district, 
or personal background with an issue. These drivers are not unique to 
the Asia-Pacific region. In the absence of concern for the broader 
regional picture, however, there is the risk that where members of 
Congress develop or show an interest in the Asia Pacific, it will be a 
narrow interest. 
For example, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Ed 
Royce, represents a large number of ethnic Korean constituents in his 
southern California district. Royce has taken a particular interest in North 
Korea issues, and has spoken out in favour of South Korea’s claim in its 
territorial dispute with Japan, despite longstanding US government policy 
to never take sides in third-party territorial disputes.46 When Japanese 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Washington in April 2015, Royce 
delayed approval for Abe’s landmark speech to a joint meeting of 
Congress over concerns, often expressed by Korean-Americans, about 
Abe’s view of Japan’s wartime history.47 Regardless of the merit of his 
positions, Royce’s advocacy on behalf of one US ally at the expense of 
another makes it more difficult for the State Department to balance the 
interests of its two Northeast Asian allies and encourage cooperation 
between them. 
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Other members have a long history of advocacy on a particular issue, 
and view the region through the prism of that issue. This is particularly 
true of human rights advocates on the Hill, many of whom question 
engagement with any country in the region with a record of human rights 
abuses, and discount efforts by US officials to work to improve the 
human rights records of all Asian countries as part of a broader regional 
strategy. For example, in 2014, 70 per cent of the hearings concerning 
the Asia Pacific held by the House Foreign Affairs Committee and its 
subcommittees focused on issues of human rights and democracy. Only 
9 per cent of hearings on the Middle East and 14 per cent of the 
hearings on Europe focused on human rights and democracy.48 
Advocacy for democracy, human rights, and fair labour practices is a 
long-time feature of US foreign policy, and there is no suggestion here 
that it should not be. But members of Congress often seem to neglect 
the need to incorporate that advocacy into a broader approach that 
recognises other US interests in the region, if for no other reason than 
such an approach is required to make progress on any issue at all, 
including human rights. This has been less of a problem in the Senate, 
where, for example, Senator McCain has used his considerable 
credibility, as a victim of Vietnamese torture when he was a prisoner of 
war, to argue for an approach that deepens engagement with Hanoi 
while still advancing US advocacy for human rights there.49 
But the loss of other senior leaders who can frame an issue more 
strategically, and the relative lack of interest in the broader region, allow 
individual members to define the US relationship with a particular 
country through the prism of a single issue. This is clearly unhelpful in 
the conduct of diplomacy in the region.  
ARMED SERVICES’ FOCUS ON CHINA 
The Senate and House Armed Services Committees’ approach to the 
region can differ significantly from their counterparts on the Foreign 
Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees. The Armed Services 
committees, primarily concerned with US–China competition when it 
comes to the Asia Pacific, often see the rest of the region in the context 
of that competition. Because the Armed Services committees write the 
annual National Defense Authorization Act — which, unlike the SFRC 
and HFAC State Department authorisation bill, passes every year — the 
Armed Services committees can wield significant influence over security-
related areas of foreign policy. The example of US relations with 
Myanmar is instructive. 
In 2014, members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee from both 
parties sought to place restrictions on the Pentagon’s ability to conduct 
military-to-military diplomatic activities with Myanmar’s military.50 The 
bills emerged at a time when there were legitimate concerns that 
Myanmar’s reform process had stalled, with several prominent instances 
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of human rights abuses, some committed by the military, receiving 
attention on Capitol Hill. But they also came at a time of increased 
concern that the military, dissatisfied with the prospect of instability in 
Myanmar, might seek to take back some of the powers it forfeited in the 
handover to quasi-civilian control in 2011.51  
The administration and reformers in Myanmar argued that the cause of 
reform would be set back by taking military-to-military diplomacy off the 
table, because military men in Myanmar are more likely to meet with and 
be persuaded by fellow uniformed officers. Some members of the Armed 
Services committees found these arguments persuasive. But more 
importantly, key members feared that keeping Myanmar’s armed forces 
at a distance would merely benefit Beijing. Determined not to lose 
Myanmar, the House Armed Services Committee used its muscle to 
work out a compromise.52 Rather than broadly restricting engagement 
with Myanmar’s Armed Forces, it specifically authorised engagement on 
human rights, civilian control, disaster relief, and military medicine, as 
well as aid in the event of a natural disaster.53 
The compromise reached on engagement with Myanmar’s military is one 
indication that attitudes toward Asia-Pacific policy may be undergoing a 
slight shift in Congress. While human rights activists might have won the 
day in previous sessions, by late last year concern about Chinese 
regional ambitions held greater sway. As concern about the expansion of 
Chinese influence carries greater and greater purchase with members of 
Congress, the likelihood increases that they will view individual countries 
and issues in East Asia in a broader regional context. 
But the adoption of a single-minded focus on US–China competition is to 
trade one narrow prism for another. There must be a more sophisticated 
understanding of the politics of the region, particularly the concern of 
most regional states (other than Japan) that they not be made to choose 
between the United States and China. US efforts to shape Chinese 
behaviour that are seen as overly confrontational may backfire. Getting 
this balance right is difficult enough for US officials at the White House, 
the State Department, and the Pentagon. Anti-Chinese activism in 
Congress, as it has at various points in the past, will make it more 
difficult still. 
AN AGENDA FOR ENHANCED ENGAGEMENT 
In an increasingly polarised Congress, increased congressional interest 
in the Asia-Pacific region can be a powerful boon for the administration 
and US partners in the region. But unless the administration and US 
partners can successfully shape that activism in the years to come, it 
could also scuttle otherwise effective diplomatic initiatives. Following are 
some suggestions for enhanced engagement between US and partner 
policymakers and Congress. 
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REFORM THE CLEARANCE PROCESS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE 
To cultivate a more nuanced understanding of the region, the 
administration should energise and streamline communication with 
congressional committees. While the Pentagon gets high marks in this 
regard, staffers and members on the Hill regularly complain that the 
State Department has stonewalled them on requests for more 
information about administration policies.54 While the congressional 
relations staff at the State Department tries hard to obtain answers to 
questions from the Hill, the much-maligned clearance process at State, 
which gives multiple officials the opportunity to revise any response, 
prevents quick action and produces least common denominator 
answers.55 Frustrated with the lag time, members often find the only way 
to extract answers from the administration is to require a report in 
statute. The administration is now required to produce thousands of 
reports every year, some of them on questions that have long been 
rendered irrelevant by events, further slowing down the bureaucracy.56 
While others have suggested reforming the clearance process more 
broadly, the State Department should take action now to streamline the 
clearance process for response to congressional inquiries. These 
reforms could then be applied more broadly later. Although streamlining 
the process might expose a difference of opinion among various 
bureaus at State, members are already well aware that these differences 
of opinion exist through regular meetings with representatives of those 
bureaus. A reformed clearance process would remove a major source of 
congressional animus toward administration officials when they are 
called upon to explain US policy.  
CULTIVATE PROMISING NEW LEADERS 
Both the administration and US partners should also invest greater time 
and resources reaching out to promising new leaders on Asia-Pacific 
issues in the House and Senate. The new chairman of the House 
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Representative Matt Salmon, has 
shown a keen interest in Asia issues since his days as a young man 
living in Taiwan. Unlike previous chairmen who ‘settled’ for the 
subcommittee chairmanship, Salmon has sought it from his first day in 
Congress.57 Since taking the gavel, he has demonstrated a 
sophisticated grasp of regional politics.58 He has energised the work of 
the committee, holding a flurry of hearings on a range of subjects in his 
first few months in office.59  
A number of more junior members of both chambers have also evinced 
an interest in Asia-Pacific affairs, which should be cultivated by the 
administration and US partners. Some of them, such as Representative 
Tulsi Gabbard of Hawaii and Representative Tammy Duckworth of 
Illinois, are veterans of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and thus 
speak with particular credibility on foreign policy issues.60 The freshman 
A number of more junior 
members of both 
chambers have also 
evinced an interest in 
Asia-Pacific affairs... 
 CONGRESS AND ASIA-PACIFIC POLICY: DYSFUNCTION AND NEGLECT 
 
17
 
senator from Alaska, Dan Sullivan, a Marine Reserve infantry officer who 
served in the Middle East and as an assistant secretary of state in the 
Bush administration, has turned his attention to Asia-Pacific policy at the 
encouragement of Senator McCain.61 
Greater efforts to consult with these members should be made by the 
Department of State, in particular. (The Department of Defense’s large 
congressional relations staff needs no encouragement in this respect.) 
US partners in the region should seek to attract these members to travel 
to the region for consultations during congressional recesses. The State 
Department should also seek to grow its Pearson Fellows Program, 
which places Foreign Service officers in congressional offices for one-
year assignments. The program is currently dwarfed by the equivalent 
program for military officers: the State Department sends 10–12 Foreign 
Service officers, while the military sends around 100.62 
American allies and security partners with high-calibre public servants, 
such as Australia and Singapore, should similarly seek arrangements to 
place their civil servants in US congressional offices. Though Australian 
public servants occasionally serve in congressional offices on irregular 
fellowship or exchange programs, the Australian Government should 
establish a program of regular exchanges that would see multiple 
Australians serving in key offices at any given time.63 Although there 
may be some sensitivities about foreign government employees working 
on the Hill, these exchanges occur regularly in the armed services and 
the rest of the executive branch. Budgetary concerns should likewise be 
considered in that context. If foreign exchange programs into US 
executive agencies are considered worth the budget, surely programs 
on Capitol Hill are at least as worthwhile. Most members, always hungry 
for additional, high-quality staff, would welcome the assistance. 
SPEAK TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 
Finally, both the administration and friendly foreign governments should 
take the opportunity to go directly to members’ supervisors: the 
American people. Ignorance or a lack of interest in the region among the 
electorate is a major reason that members are not as engaged on Asia-
Pacific policy in a strategic way. Members of the president’s cabinet 
should also speak about Asia-Pacific policy, not in Washington, but 
around the country. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter’s speech in 
Arizona in April 2014 was a good step in this direction.64 Australian and 
Southeast Asian leaders should also seek out audiences far from 
Washington to explain their region’s importance to America. 
Moreover, if President Obama truly views an increased US commitment 
to Asia as a major part of his legacy, he should speak about that 
commitment to the American people himself. The importance of the US 
commitment to Asia, and the role it plays in his biography and legacy, 
should be a major theme of the valedictory address that Obama will give 
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as he prepares to leave office in January 2017. Such speeches can be 
influential, as Eisenhower’s farewell address famously showed.65 An 
Obama speech highlighting his legacy on Asia could do the same. 
CONCLUSION 
The US Congress shows few signs of emerging from its deepening 
partisanship and institutional paralysis, but there are recent signs of 
increased interest in the Asia-Pacific region in the current Congress. The 
nature of that interest and whether it can be sustained will depend on 
efforts by individual members, administration officials, and US allies and 
partners in the years to come. 
In this new environment, US policymakers and partners in the region 
must ask how they can most effectively advocate for an adroit US 
engagement in the region in their new circumstances. This Analysis 
provides only a few suggestions, mainly in the way of more responsive 
and more active engagement with members. It is incumbent on all US 
policymakers and partners in the region with an interest in an engaged 
United States to continue to look for new ways to work with Congress to 
ensure that it is a partner, rather than an obstacle, to the maintenance of 
the liberal order in the region. 
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